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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of private and public sector led financial sector transparency on bank 
interest margins across eighty-six economies. Using a two-step dynamic system generalized method of 
moments, least square dummy variables, fixed effects and bootstrap quantile panel models between 2005 
and 2016, the findings of the two-step GMM are reported as follows. First, results reveal that financial 
sector transparency whether led by private or public sector reduces interest margins. Second, while no 
statistical evidence was found on which of the two (private or public sector led transparency) is more 
effective in dealing with bank interest margins, public sector-led financial transparency is found to be more 
consistent in reducing bank interest margins across many more economies. Third, the study shows that the 
effect of financial sector transparency is visible at lower and middle levels of bank interest margins implying 
that economies with lower and moderately high bank interest margin level can benefit more from policies 
targeted at improving transparency in the financial sector. These findings imply that the sampled countries 
must enact policies and laws that deepen and expand financial sector transparency in order to potentially 
reduce bank interest margins for the good of banking market participants and society at large. 
Keywords: Financial Sector Transparency; Net Interest margins; Private Sector; Public Sector 
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Introduction 
Financial institutions especially banks across the world perform functions such as mobilization of savings 
and deposits, evaluation of viable and value-adding projects, allocation and distribution of loans and credit, 
and monitoring financial market participants. These activities have been shown in the literature to promote 
economic growth and development (see Gamra, 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005; Beck and Levine, 2004). 
However, these functions performed by financial institutions, specifically, banks are obstructed and 
impeded by lack of information and data arising from information asymmetry in financial markets (Kusi, 
Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako, 2017; 2016). Information asymmetry has adverse effects on 
financial markets. First, it obstructs financial sector transparency in the credit market, resulting in adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and, second, the lack of accurate, reliable and complete information causes 
credit rationing (Park, Brandt and Giles, 2003; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Freimer and Gordon, 1965), high credit risk and instability (Kusi, Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako, 
2017; Kusi, Agbloyor, Fiador and Osei, 2016), uncertainty and inaccuracy in lending decisions (Asongu and 
Odhiambo, 2019; Barth, Lin, Lin and Song, 2009; Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Barron and Staten, 2003; 
Galindo and Miller, 2001). Thus, by reducing information asymmetry which enhances financial sector 
transparency, the effective and efficient functioning and operations of banks is improved. The essence of 
financial sector transparency has led most developing economies to set up private and public information 
sharing institutions (See Asongu, Anyanwu and Tchamyou, 2017; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017). 
One critical factor that sums up the financial intermediation role played by banks is the net interest margins, 
otherwise called bank spread or mark up (see Allen, 1988). Net interest margin is popularly defined as the 
difference between interest income (loan price) and interest expense (deposit price) (Carbo, Humphrey, 
Maudos and Molyneux, 2009; Allen, 1988). Although several studies (both empirical and theoretical)2 have 
assessed the role and determinants of net interest margins of banks, the conceptualization of net interest 
margins has varied among studies. While Gyeke-Dako, Agbloyor, Turkson and Baffour (2018), Mensah and 
Abor (2014) and Naceur (2003) conceptualize net interest margins as cost arising from the existence of the 
financial intermediation process (social cost of financial intermediation) borne by financial market 
participants and the entire society or economy, Carbo, Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux (2009) 
conceptualize net interest margins as an indicator of the competitiveness of the banking system arguing 
                                                          
2 See (Ho and Saunders, 1981; McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and de Guevara, 2004; 
Carbó and Rodriguez, 2007; Brock & Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Naceur, 2003; Beck et al., 2009; 
Garza-García, 2010; Hamadi et al., 2012; Tarus et al., 2012; Were and Wambua, 2014). 
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that in a competitive banking market, banks do not have the luxury or market power to price interest income 
or revenue far above their interest expenses; hence, the latter argument suggests narrow margins for 
banks. Similarly, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Kasman, Tunc and Okan (2010) and Naceur and Goaied 
(2008) have also conceptualized net interest margins as a profitability indicator for banks. Amidst the 
different conceptualization of net interest margins, net interest margin remains a key factor that tends to 
summarize in a snapshot the financial intermediation activity of financial intermediaries. Obviously, the 
different conceptualization of interest margins provides a sense of the complex nature of its drivers (Carbo, 
Humphrey, Maudos and Molyneux, 2009). That is, while net interest margins remain important and well 
researched in the finance literature, there is a huge complexity on its determinants, which heavily depend 
on household or firm conditions (such as discount rate, loan-servicing ratios, standard of living), industry 
conditions (competition and structure of the industry) and macroeconomic conditions such as economic 
growth, unemployment rate and inflation; hence making it difficult to fully capture net interest margins in 
totality. 
Existent empirical literature report that interest margins are wide (Were and Wambua, 2014; Garr and 
Coleman, 2013; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 2006) especially in developing economies and have serious 
implications for economies and financial market participants. For instance, Islam and Nishiyama (2016) 
advance that very high and volatile interest margins have severe devastating implications for bank 
management and can create distrust among participants of the banking market, leading to possible credit 
risk crises and instability in the banking market (Dwumfour, 2017;  Islam and Nishiyama, 2016).Thus, very 
high and volatile interest margins may render bank participants incapable of honoring debt-servicing 
obligations, slow down  borrowing and economic activities leading to possible banking challenges. As a 
result of the critical nature of net interest margins and implications for banking, Hawtrey and Liang (2008) 
advocate for regular updates on the knowledge, monitoring and tracking of determinants of net interest 
margins so as to aid policymakers in managing net interest margins to send the right and positive signals to 
investors and other banking market participants.  
Given the advice of Hawtrey and Liang (2008), it is not surprising to find many studies that explore the 
determinants of bank interest margins across economies. Despite the numerous empirical studies on bank 
interest margins, the nexus between net interest margins and financial sector transparency is sparse in the 
empirical literature although theoretical literature suggests that financial sector transparency or reduced 
information asymmetry lowers net interest margins. The argument of this study on the existence of a 
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relationship between net interest margins and financial sector transparency follows theories and empirical 
studies. First, empirical literature (see Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Hawtrey and Liang, 
2008) argues that bank credit risk exposure resulting from information asymmetry and lack of transparency 
in the financial market force banks to charge high premiums on loans to make up for credit losses leading 
to wide net interest margins. Similarly, Asongu (2017) and Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019) 
find that information sharing which enhances financial sector transparency reduces loan price; hence 
lowers margins. Also, Kusi and Mensah (2018) show that financial sector transparency through credit 
information sharing reduces the funding cost of banks leading to lower loan prices and bank interest 
margins. Given the empirical findings of prior studies, the study hypothesizes that financial sector 
transparency may reduce the net interest margins since the bank funding cost, credit risk and loan prices 
which increase interest margins are reduced and eroded by financial sector transparency. It is worthwhile to 
note that transparency in the form information provision by regulators may not only relevant for banking 
market participants but also relevant for stock market participants (Corbet, Dunne and Larkin, 2019). 
From a theoretical perspective (information asymmetry and information sharing theories), enhancing 
financial sector transparency through credit information sharing erodes information asymmetry, leading to 
reduced uncertainties in bank lending and improvements in the predictive power of banks in lending 
decision making (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 1987; 1992;Freimer and Gordon, 1965; Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). From the above empirical and theoretical discussions, the study takes the advantage of the lack of 
empirical studies on the nexus between financial sector transparency and net interest margins despite 
theoretical and empirical justification of this relationship and contends that financial sector transparency 
through credit information sharing reduces net interest margins. Also, following prior empirical studies (Kusi 
and Mensah, 2018; Asongu, 2017; Kusi et al., 2017) that advance that financial sector transparency 
through credit information sharing institution can be led by either the private or public sector, the study also 
attempts to provide empirical evidence on which of the two (private sector-led transparency or public 
sector-led transparency) is most effective in reducing interest margins knowing that the features of private 
and public led financial sector transparency are different (see Barron and Staten, 2003; Galindo and Miller, 
2001;Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Miller, 2003) and can affect their 
effectiveness and efficient operation. 
This study’s attempt to establish the effect of financial sector transparency on bank net interest margin 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the study to the best of our knowledge is the first to 
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present international evidence on the nexus between financial sector transparency and bank interest 
margins. Second, the study documents for the first time to the best of our knowledge, evidence on whether 
private or public sector led financial sector transparency is more effective and robust in dealing with bank 
interest margins which has the potential to distort trust and operations of the banking sector. Third, the 
study provides continental and threshold analyses to deepen the knowledge on financial sector 
transparency and bank interest margins. The rest of the study is organized as follows. After this introduction 
is an overview of financial sector transparency and interest margins, followed by a literature review and 
insights into the methodology. The empirical results and discussion section is followed by another section 
on conclusions and policy implications. 
Theoretical Underpinnings: Financial Intermediation, Information Sharing and Net Interest margins  
The literature on net interest margins is argued to stem from the dealership or the financial intermediation 
theory (also known as dealership theory) (see Ho and Saunders, 1981; Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevara, 2004). The theory advances that banks are match makers who link deficit spending units to 
surplus spending units to make a gain. Thus, banks receive deposits at random intervals and subsequently 
utilize the deposits to satisfy stochastically received loan demands from credit market participants. Under 
the theory (financial intermediation theory), banks are risk-averse but value maximizers who profit from 
matchmaking business. To ensure their profit maximization objective is reached, they set loan and deposit 
prices in a manner that reduces their risk exposure in the matchmaking business. Thus, given the 
uncertainty and risky nature of the lending business arising from information asymmetry and lack of 
transparency in the financial market, banks price their loan relatively higher than normal in order to 
safeguard themselves against default and interest rate risks (Williams, 2007). This implies that information 
asymmetry and lack of transparency in the financial market widens the net interest margin given that banks 
price their loans higher above normal to deal with the risks associated with their business.  
Similarly, following the information sharing theory (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 1987; Freimer and Gordon, 
1965) which hinges on the information asymmetry theory, Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick (2007) advance that 
information sharing sanitizes the financial market by reducing risk in two ways: one, through the screening 
effect, and, two, through the incentive or motivational effect. The screening effect states that as banks or 
lenders share credit information among themselves, they enhance their predictive power by being able to 
screen out bad financial participants (lemons) from good financial participants (diamonds) (see Kusi, 
Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako, 2017; Asongu and Odhiambo, 2018) which reduces lender adverse 
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selection errors. This mitigates the level of riskiness in the financial market. On the other hand, the 
motivational or incentive effect states that due to the sharing of credit information among banks or lenders 
and denial for accessing credit in the future, financial market participants are pressured to honor and be 
truthful towards the financial commitments since default and non-compliance of participants are reported 
and affect the rating of defaulters (see Kusi and Opoku-Mensah, 2018). Thus, in both cases (screen and 
incentive effects), the riskiness in the financial market is reduced. This enables lender certainty in 
predictions and operations and lowers the premium charged for unanticipated riskiness of the financial 
system.  
It is believed that the banks price or charge their loans relatively higher than normal in order to safeguard 
themselves against default and interest rate risks (Williams, 2007) which arise due to lack of transparency 
in the financial market. Therefore, acknowledging all the complexities surrounding net interest margins, it is 
hypothesized that improving financial sector transparency through credit information sharing can help 
reduce financial market riskiness which may translate into reduced bank interest margins. Furthermore, 
following the dealership or financial intermediation theory which advances that the intermediation process is 
done under uncertainty and characterized by several risks, improving transparency may lead to certainty in 
the intermediation process resulting in lower charges (interest rate) in the financial intermediation process. 
Interestingly, existent literature (Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010; Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007; 
Miller, 2003; Tchamyou, 2019) argues that information sharing can be done through either public credit 
registries or private credit bureaus. Thus, while the public credit registries are owned and managed by 
public sector agents (central banks), the private credit bureaus are managed and owned by the private 
sector. Miller (2003) advances key and critical differences between public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus (see Appendix 6); stating that private credit bureaus are more effective compared to public credit 
registries given that they are normally owned and managed by the private sector, well-resourced, and cover 
wider and more detailed credit information. More recently, Goodell, Goyal and Hasan (2020) confirms the 
assertion of Miller (2003) by showing that for-profit firms which are usually private firms are more inclined to 
be transparent compared to nonprofit firms which are usually public firms.  
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Empirical Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
From an empirical perspective, the study finds numerous studies that investigate determinants of net 
interest margins. However, no study to the best of our research knowledge investigates the link between 
net interest margins and financial sector transparency. Hence, the empirical justification for positing the 
existence of this relation between net interest margin and financial sector transparency is rooted in a 
number of studies by Kusi and Mensah (2018), Kusi et al. (2017; 2016), Asongu (2017) and Asongu, le 
Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019). First, Kusi and Mensah (2018) investigated how transparency in the 
credit market through credit information sharing affects the funding cost of 233 banks in 17 African 
countries between 2006 and 2012. Employing two-step generalized methods of moment models, they show 
that transparency through coverage, presence and quality of private and public information sharing 
institutions reduce funding cost of banks. Specifically, the effect of transparency through credit information 
sharing on bank funding cost was more significant for transparency through private credit bureaus. 
Following, the cost minimization concept, a reduction in the funding cost of firms should translate into lower 
pricing of goods and services. Likewise, the study contends that a reduction in the funding cost of banks 
through transparency in the financial market should translate into lower loan prices; however there is no 
empirical evidence to this effect. Second, a strand of literature shows that transparency through credit 
information sharing reduces credit risk of banks. For instance, Kusi, Agbloyor, Ansah-Adu and Gyeke-Dako 
(2017) examined the effect of credit information sharing which is a financial sector transparency measure 
on credit risk of banks in low and high income economies in Africa between 2006 and 2012. Employing 
Prais-Winsten regression model on 548 bank-year observations, they report that transparency through 
credit information sharing is crucial for reducing credit risk and even more importantly in lowering income 
economies. Similar studies (including Doblas-Madrid and Minetti, 2013; Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012; 
Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo, 2009; Brown, Jappelli and Pagano, 2009; Luoto, McIntosh and Wydick, 
2007; Powell, Majnoni, Miller and Mylenko, 2004) confirm this finding. Again, Buyukkarabacak and Valev 
(2012) showed using a comprehensive cross-country between 1975 and 2006 that credit information 
sharing which is a financial sector transparency measure reduces the likelihood of banking crises. 
Following the financial intermediation or dealership theory, banks manage credit risk and crises by passing 
on defaults to borrowers through the premium they charge on loans; leading to higher loan prices. The 
present study argues that since transparency in the financial market through credit information sharing 
reduces credit risk and crises, it may also reduce the passage of default and crises costs  to borrowers 
through the pricing of loans; hence translate into reduced net interest margins. 
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Third, Asongu (2017) examined the effect of financial sector transparency through credit information 
sharing offices on bank loan prices in Africa. Employing generalized method of moments and instrumental 
quantile models in a panel data of 162 banks in 42 African economies, the results show that information 
sharing offices which promote financial sector transparency reduce loan price through private and public 
credit information sharing offices. Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019) similarly investigated the 
relationship between loan prices and quality and information sharing offices which are financial sector 
transparency enforcement institutions. Employing generalized method of moment and instrumental 
quantile models in a panel data of 162 banks in 42 African economies between 2002 and 2011, the results 
show that information sharing offices (which promote financial sector transparency) through information 
and communication technology reduce loan price and improve loan quantity. Based on this strand of 
empirical literature that shows that financial sector transparency reduces loan prices, the present study 
contends that reduced loan prices resulting from improved financial sector transparency may translate into 
lower net interest margins. More recently, Andries, Nistor and Sprincean (2020) examined the effect of 
central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Using a panel of 34 banks between 2005 and 2012, their results show that central bank transparency 
contributes positively and significantly to financial institutions systemic risk. On the contrary, increase in 
central bank transparency rather reduced idiosyncratic risk of banks. From their finding, it is clear that 
central bank transparency is beneficial from a micro-prudential perspective but creates incentives for 
financial institutions to engage in risky activities through herd behavior. . 
 
Given the theoretical and empirical discussions on the ability of financial sector transparency through credit 
information sharing to reduce credit risk, banking crises and loan prices, it is obvious that these may lead to 
lower net interest margins although  extant literature has not advanced to this stage. Hence, based on the 
discussions on prior theories and empirical literature, this study contends that financial sector transparency 
through credit information sharing should lead to lower net interest margins. Furthermore, given that 
financial sector transparency may be led by the private or public sector, we again hypothesize following 
Asongu (2017), Tchamyou (2019), and Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke (2019), that public sector-
led financial sector transparency should have a larger effect on reducing bank spreads given its ease of 
accessibility relative to private sector-led financial sector transparency. Hence, the present study 
investigates the effect of financial sector transparency on net interest margins using cross-country data 
covering countries in Africa, Europe, Asia, Northern and Southern America. 
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Overview of Financial Sector Transparency and Net Interest margins 
This section presents an overview of financial sector transparency and net interest margins across 
countries between 2005 and 2016. Financial sector transparency is measured as private credit bureau 
coverage (orange line) and public credit registry coverage (ash line) which are credit information sharing 
variables that offer transparency in the credit or banking market. While private credit bureau coverage and 
public credit registry coverage measures financial sector transparency led by the private sector and public 
sector respectively, net interest margin is the difference between bank interest income and interest 
expense.  
Figure 1: Yearly Trends in Net Interest Margins, Private and Public Sector Led Financial Sector 
Transparency across Countries between 2005 and 2016 
 
Sources: By Authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Global Financial Development Database. Note: 
bank net interest margins (Blue Line); private sector led financial transparency (Orange Line); Public-public sector led financial 
sector transparency (Ash Line) – Note - The data on private credit bureau coverage and public credit registry coverage were 
obtained from the World Development Indicators database whilst the net interest margin data was obtained from the Global 
Financial Development database. 
 
From Figure 1, it is observed that private sector-led transparency (Orange line) represented by private 
credit bureau has progressively improved from 15.13% in 2005 to 29.24% in 2016, implying that availability 
and coverage of credit information through the private sector in the credit market which enhances 
transparency has improved consistently between 2005 and 2016.  A similar trend is apparent in public 
credit bureau coverage (ash line) which measures public sector-led financial transparency between 2005 
and 2016. Thus, public sector-led financial transparency consistently improves from 3.33% in 2005 to 
12.57% in 2016 implying that availability and coverage of credit information in the credit market which 
enhances transparency has improved remarkably between 2005 and 2017. However, it is important to note 
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that private sector-led financial sector transparency is higher and has improved more compared to public 
sector-led financial sector transparency. Interestingly, it is observed that net interest margin (blue line) 
declines slowly especially after 2007 when the recent global financial crises started. Thus, while net interest 
margin is highest (5.09%) in 2007, it declines to 4.28% in 2016 implying that net interest margin which 
represents the spread has consistently decreased from 2005 to 2016.  
Table 1: Trends in Net Interest Margins, Private and Public sector led Financial Sector Transparency 
across Regions 
  North & South America Africa Europe Asia and Oceania  
Year NIM PRIVATE PUBLIC NIM PRIVATE PUBLIC NIM PRIVATE PUBLIC NIM PRIVATE PUBLIC 
2005 5.366 23.837 5.847 6.863 3.489 1.187 3.413 26.024 4.6 4.417 12.08 1.972 
2006 5.364 27.517 6.963 6.849 3.457 1.328 3.294 28.403 6.203 4.317 12.194 2.664 
2007 5.578 31.851 7.516 7.155 4.31 1.445 3.235 32.22 6.888 4.635 12.947 2.871 
2008 5.566 30.765 8.584 6.362 4.579 1.698 2.97 33.785 8.471 4.532 14.716 3.937 
2009 5.534 33.042 9.613 6.238 4.685 1.783 3.144 35.155 11.762 4.151 16.986 4.159 
2010 5.332 33.606 9.539 6.095 4.93 2.198 3.063 38.343 13.238 4.341 18.243 4.769 
2011 5.481 32.794 8.944 6.126 5.313 2.526 2.965 43.156 15.349 4.226 20.276 6.712 
2012 5.257 33.44 9.972 6.065 5.473 3.361 2.885 41.55 16.327 4.213 21.594 7.326 
2013 5.145 40.146 12.84 5.981 6.062 3.372 2.783 44.298 16.967 4.005 22.564 9.143 
2014 5.294 41.906 12.754 5.649 5.972 3.474 2.644 44.007 18.262 3.869 24.488 8.943 
2015 4.948 43.017 12.503 5.987 6.473 4.512 2.416 45.684 21.062 3.494 25.971 10.434 
2016 5.223 44.166 13.286 6.234 7.139 5.696 2.622 47.922 21.773 3.32 25.018 10.991 
             
Average 5.341 34.674 9.863 6.300 5.157 2.715 2.953 38.379 13.409 4.127 18.923 6.160 
Sources: Computed by Authors based on data from World Development Indicators and Global Financial Development Database 
- Note – NIM-bank net interest margins; Private-private sector led financial transparency; Public-public sector led financial 
sector transparency 
Even when the data is split into North and South America, Africa, Europe and Asia and Oceania regions in 
Table 1, similar trends and patterns are observed as in Figure 1. Thus, on average, financial sector 
transparency whether led by private and public sector improved, while net interest margins declined on the 
average across the regions (see Table 1). Interestingly, it is observed that the European region which 
reported the highest average private and public sector led financial sector transparency of 38.38% and 
13.41% respectively, also reported the lowest net interest margin of 2.95%, while the African region which 
reported the lowest average private and public sector led financial sector transparency of 5.16% and 2.72% 
respectively also reported the highest net interest margins of 6.3%. Observing these patterns where 
financial sector transparency improves while bank spread declines in the same period, it is intuitive to 
enquire if the decline in net interest margin is traceable to the increase in financial sector transparency, 
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and, if so which financial sector transparency (private or public sector led transparency) is more responsible 
for the decline. Indeed, Figure 1 and Table 1, provide preliminary evidence of a negative relationship 
between financial sector transparency and net interest margins. That is, as financial sector transparency 
improved overtime, net interest margins correspondingly fell across the world and various continental 
groupings. Consequently, formal econometric analysis in the next sections will seek to isolate the effect of 
financial sector transparency on bank interest margins. 
 
Methodology 
A panel data strategy is employed to attain the objective of establishing the effect of financial sector 
transparency through credit information sharing institutions on bank interest spreads. Following Brooks 
(2008) and Baltagi, Song and Koh (2003), panel data is deemed to be more reliable, accurate and 
consistent compared to the traditional time series and cross-sectional data strategies. They argue that 
panel data strategy captures both time and entity dimensions of data while time series and cross sectional 
data strategies capture time and entity dimensions of data only, respectively. Hence, panel data strategy 
provides more convincing and accurate results. Data used is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators and the Global Financial Development Database between 2005 and 2016. Specifically, while the 
bank related variables are obtained from Global Financial Development Database, the financial sector 
transparency variables are obtained from World Development Indicators. Both database house yearly 
country-level macroeconomic and financial variables. The data covers eighty-six economies across the 
globe. We provide details on the variables in Table 2, and additional insights into the databases and 
variables in Appendix 7. Following the panel framework, we express the general panel form as: 
 
Yi,t=  αij + γtj + βXi,t + εi,t……..(Eq. 1), 
 
where, subscript i signifies the cross sectional dimension (country) i=1. . . N and t signifies the time series 
dimension (time), t=1…T; Yitis the dependent variable; αiis scalar and constant term for all periods (t) and 
specific to a country’s fixed effect (i); γt is the time fixed effect t; β is a k×1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the independent variables; Xit is a 1× k vector of observations on the independent variables 
comprising of input variables in the model which includes controlled variables and εit which is iid is the error 
term. 
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Estimation strategy 
In this study, the robust fixed effect, bootstrap quantile, least square dummy variable corrected bias 
(LSDVC) and two-step generalized method of moments are used for the estimations. Following the 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) (see Appendix 1) Lagrange multiplier test for random effects, the results 
provided evidence for the use of generalized least squares models ahead of ordinary least squares. 
Furthermore, the Hausman (1978) (see Appendix 2) test justified the selection and use of the fixed effect 
models. To correct for heteroscedasticity (see Appendix 3) and autocorrelation (Appendix 4) problems in 
the fixed effect models, the robust standard errors approach is used. Furthermore, Nguyen (2012) suggests 
a potential endogeneity (simultaneity problem) arising from joint determination between net interest margins 
and non-interest income (see Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). Also, the dynamic term 
in the model correlates with the fixed effect component in the error term leading to another form of 
endogeneity. Therefore, the GMM is an appropriate technique to control for such possible endogeneity 
faced in this study. Given the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and Winmeijer (2005) show that the two-step generalized method of moments estimation technique, unlike 
the one-step generalized method of moments estimation technique provides the opportunity to control and 
correct for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Hence, in accordance with contemporary 
GMM-centric literature (Tchamyou, 2020; Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon, 2019), the two-step 
generalized method of moments estimation technique is the preferred technique for this study. To shed 
more insights into financial sector transparency and bank interest margins, bootstrap quantile regression 
models are used to investigate at which level of bank interest margin is financial sector transparency most 
effective in dealing with bank interest margins. The quantile regression model is robust to outliers (Koenker, 
2005; Cade & Noon, 2003), provides more detailed information on sample (Wei, Pere &Koenker, 2006) and 
avoids the parametric distribution assumptions of the error process (Koenker, 2005; Cade & Noon, 2003). 
The study models net interest margins following the study of Tarus, Chekol and Mutwol (2012). Hence, the 
net interest margin models to be estimated are: 
NIMi,t= β0+ β1NIMi,t-1+ β2PRIVATE-TRANSi,t + β3COST-INCOMEi,t + β4NONPERFORMi,t+ β5INFLi,t+ 
β6GDPGROWTHij,t + + β7BANKCONi,t + β8BANKDIVi,t+ β9RRATEi,t+ β9FINCRISESt +εij,t……………………(Eq. 2 
– PrivateSectorLed Financial Transparency), 
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NIMi,t= β0+ β1NIMi,t-1+ β2PUBBLIC-TRANSi,t + β3COST-INCOMEi,t + β4NONPERFORMi,t+ β5INFLi,t+ 
β6GDPGROWTHij,t + + β7BANKCONi,t + β8BANKDIVi,t+ β9RRATEi,t+ β9FINCRISESt +εij,t  ……………………(Eq. 3- 
Public SectorLed Financial Transparency), 
NIMi,t= β0+ β1NIMi,t-1+ β2PRIVATE-TRANSi,t+ β3PRIVATE-TRANSi,t ++ β4COST-INCOMEi,t + 
β5NONPERFORMi,t+ β6INFLi,t+ β7GDPGROWTHij,t + +β8BANKCONi,t + β9BANKDIVi,t + β10FINCRISESt+ 
β9RRATEi,t+εij,t ……………………(Eq. 4 –Private and Public SectorLed Financial Transparency) 
Definition and Selection of Variables 
Net Interest Margins (NIM) 
Net interest margin is used as a dependent variable. It is measured as the difference between bank interest 
income (loan price) and bank interest expense divided by total assets (see Carbo et al, 2009). Allen (1988) 
also refers to net interest margins as bank spread or mark-up. Net interest margin is founded on the 
dealership or financial intermediation theory where, the spread summarizes the profit to the banks, 
competitiveness of the banking sector and cost of the intermediation process to the society (financial 
market participants) or economy. 
Financial Sector Transparency (PRIVATE-TRANS and PUBLIC-TRANS) 
Financial sector transparency is an indication of reduced information asymmetry in the credit market. It is 
measured by credit information sharing through private and public credit information sharing institution 
coverages. Both private and public credit information sharing institutions provide valuable information that 
sanitizes the banking market; hence improving certainty and assurance in credit allocation (Asongu, 2017; 
Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke, 2019; Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2012; Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer, 2007) and recovery of loans and asset quality in banking business (Kusi et al., 2017; 2016; Dobls-
Madrid and Minetti, 2013; Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012; Houston, Lin, Lin and Ma, 2010). Through certainty 
and assurance offered by financial sector transparency, mark-ups on premium margins resulting from 
uncertainties and credit risk exposures are minimized. This translates into lower bank interest margins; 
hence financial sector transparency reduces bank interest margins. However, we expect public sector-led 
financial sector transparency to have a larger effect on bank interest margins given its ease of accessibility 
relative to private sector-led financial sector transparency. 
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Operating Cost to Income (COST-INCOME) 
Operating cost to income is an efficiency measure which is deemed to capture the variations in bank 
interest margins. Measured as operating expenses to total operating income. Higher values of this ratio 
depict lower efficiency while lower values depict higher efficiency (Tarus et al., 2012; Carbo and Rodrigues, 
2007). A positive relationship is expected between interest margins and this efficiency measure show that 
banks pass on their operating cost to the depositors and lenders through the deposits and lending rates 
(see Tarus et al., 2012; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Abreu and Mendes, 2003); making the 
margins wider. Similarly, following cost and pricing strategies in business, costs are considered as major 
factors in determining prices of products or services. From a banking perspective, a bank incurring high 
operating costs would like to pass it onto their clients in order to cover their operating cost (Maria and 
Agoraki, 2010; Martinez, Peria and Mody, 2004). Hence, a positive relationship between margins and 
operating cost to income is rational and intuitive.  
Credit Risk (NONPERFORM) 
Credit risk is measured as nonperforming loans to total loans and advances. This captures the portion of 
loans that go bad and are irrecoverable. Following prior studies (see Tarus et al., 2012; Angbazo, 1997), 
credit risk is expected to have a positive effect on bank interest margins. The argument is that credit risk is 
an indication of loans at risk which require capital to correct defaulted client contractual obligations. Hence, 
higher risk from more credit risk and the capital required to correct the default forces banks to increase the 
cost of loan prices as compensation for assuming more risk (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; 
Drako, 2002). However, a negative relationship could exist between credit risk and margins as bad loans 
reduce the possible margins bank can make on their loans; hence a reducing effect on bank interest 
margins.  
Inflation (INFL) 
Inflation is measured with the consumer price index and depicts the degree of stability or volatilities in an 
economy. The relationship between bank interest margins and inflation is not straight forward given that 
prior studies (see Rasiah, 2010; Perry, 1992) argue that this nexus largely depends on banks’ ability to 
anticipate inflationary movement. Thus, where banks fully anticipate inflation and so set loan prices to pass 
it on to the clients, a positive nexus is expected. However, where banks are slow and sluggish in 
anticipating inflation and fail to set loan prices that capture inflation, a negative nexus is expected. In this 
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present study, a positive effect is expected between inflation and bank interest margins as banks are likely 
to pass on the risk of inflation to their clients through the lending rate. . 
Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDPGROWTH) 
Gross domestic product growth is an indicator of economic conditions and welfare of citizens in an 
economy. It is believed that the welfare of citizens affect the demand and supply of bank products and 
services like deposits and loans which impact bank interest margins. The nexus between bank interest 
margins and economic growth is ambiguous in the empirical literature. Those studies (Islam and 
Nishiyama, 2016; Tarus et al., 2012; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004) that found a negative nexus argue that 
improved economic growth represents enhanced welfare and signals ability to honor credit or loan 
obligations. Hence, it prompts banks to reduce the premium charged on defaults leading to reduced bank 
interest margins. However, the studies that found positive effect of gross domestic product growth rate on 
bank interest margins (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001) argue that improved welfare signals 
ability to pay and service credit obligations; hence resulting in increased bank interest margins because of 
a higher ability to service loans (or pay loan interest) during economic growth periods. 
  
Bank Concentration (BANKCON) 
Bank concentration is used as an indicator of financial structure of the banking sector and measured as the 
total assets of the largest top three banks to total banking assets of all banks. From the literature there are 
contrasting views on the relationship between bank interest margins and concentration. De Haaan and 
Poghosyan (2012) and Tarus et al. (2012) found a negative effect of concentration on bank interest 
margins arguing that regulators have easier tasks of monitoring banks in a concentrated banking market 
because there are fewer banks. Hence, in such markets bank interest margins are lower given the ability of 
regulators to monitor the fewer banks in the industry. However, majority of studies (see Islam and 
Nishiyama, 2016; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000) found a 
positive nexus between bank interest margins and concentration arguing that concentration increases 
market power of the fewer banks in the industry; hence inducing the monopolistic power of banks to charge 
higher loan prices and earn higher interest margins or spread. Hence, the relationship between bank 
interest margins and concentration could be positive or negative. 
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Bank-Noninterest Income (BANKDIV) 
Bank noninterest income represents diversification and earnings from outside core banking business. It is 
measured as noninterest income to total income. Following the literature (for instance Stiroh, 2004), a 
deviation from the core banking business which results in interest margins will reduce the interest margins. 
Hence, a negative relationship is expected between non-interest income and bank interest margins. 
 
 
Table 2: Description and Summary of Variables  
Symbols Names Measurements 
Expected 
Signs Sources 
NIM Net Interest Margins 
[Interest Income - Interest 
Expense]/total Assets 
 
Global Financial 
Development  
PRIVATE-TRAN 
Private Sector 
Financial Sector 
Transparency 
Percentage of Adult Population 
covered by private bureaus - 
World Development 
Indicators 
PUBLIC-TRAN 
Public Sector 
Financial Sector 
Transparency 
Percentage of Adult Population 
covered by public registries - 
World Development 
Indicators 
COST-INCOME Cost Efficiency Operational cost/total income + 
Global Financial 
Development  
NONPERFORM Credit Risk 
nonperforming loans/total loans 
and advances +/- 
Global Financial 
Development  
INFL Inflation Consumer Price Index +/- 
World Development 
Indicators 
GDPGROWTH 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
[Current GDP-Previous 
GDP]/Previous GDP +/- 
World Development 
Indicators 
BANKCON Bank Concentration 
Total Assets of Largest Three 
Banks/ Total Industry Assets + 
Global Financial 
Development  
BANKDIV Bank Diversification Non-interest income/ total income - 
Global Financial 
Development  
RRATE Real Interest Rate Lending Rate-Inflation + Computed by Authors 
FINCRISES Financial Crises 
Dummy which assumes a value of 
1 for years 2007, 2008 and 2009 
and 0 otherwise - 
Capture Authors 
Following Dietrich and 
Wanzeried, 2011; 
Goddard, Molyneux 
and Wilson, 2009 
Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial 
sector transparency led by public sector; COST-INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-
gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial 
crises; RRATE-real interest Rate 
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Real Interest Rate (RRATE) 
Real interest rate is used to capture price of loans or credit advanced by banks. It is computed as lending 
rate less inflation and is expected to increase interest margins. Thus, banks rely on interest rate to generate 
of their interest income and hence a positive relationship is expected between real interest rate and interest 
margins. This expectation is in accordance with prior studies including Saunders and Schumacher (2000) 
and Wong (1997). 
 
Financial Crises (FINCRISES) 
Financial crises capture the effect of the recent 2007-2009 global financial crises. The financial crises are 
deemed to have impacted the financial intermediation process across the global especially in Europe 
(Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2009). The expectation is that financial crises undermine the ability of 
banks to earn higher margins because the ability to pay and service loans reduces during financial crises 
periods; leading to reduced bank interest margins. 
 
 
Empirical results and Discussions 
From the summary statistics, outliers which have the possibility to influence the consistency, efficiency and 
biasedness of coefficients were not observed in the dataset. The Shapiro Wilk’s normality test is used to 
test for the normality of the data. Thus, the Shapiro Wilk’s test which has a null hypothesis of no normal 
distribution was rejected for all the variables indicating that the variables were all normally distributed 
around their means. Similarly, from the same table, the variance inflation factor (VIF) which indicates the 
acceptability of each variable shows that all the variables are accepted in the model, given that none of the 
VIF values exceeded the maximum threshold of 10. 
The Pearson’s correlation matrix that serves as a mechanism for checking and controlling multicollinearity 
is shown in Table 4. Following Kennedy (2008), independent variables are deemed to be multicollinear 
when the correlational value exceeds 0.7. Hence, the results presented in Table 4 shows no evidence of 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, from Table 3 (see VIF column) which provides evidence of acceptability of 
the variables in the models estimated, we find evidence that all the variables are accepted and fit to be in 
the model. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable Obs  Mean Std.Dev.  Min  Max SWILK VIF 
nim 3631 4.799 3.088 .032 23.32 13.21***  
private-trans 2418 23.133 34.134 0 100 12.71*** 1.49 
public-trans 2418 8.065 17.222 0 100 15.48*** 1.09 
cost-income 3291 56.37 14.72 19.988 100 4.09*** 1.46 
nonperform 2008 7.281 7.553 .01 74.1 14.19*** 1.24 
inf 4498 7.39 11.346 -18.109 98.773 17.97*** 1.90 
gdpgrwoth 5334 3.592 5.97 -64.047 88.958 16.99*** 1.17 
bankcon 3143 70.474 20.081 18.39 100 8.71*** 1.12 
bankdiv 3325 38.878 14.977 1.425 93.701 9.87*** 1.36 
rrate 1783 6.459 8.458 -67.264 62.618 13.62*** 1.82 
fincrises 5778 .074 .262 0 1 6.87*** 1.09 
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 – values are in percentages - Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-
TRANS-financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; 
COST-INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; 
BANKCON-bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises 
 
Table 4: Pairwise correlations  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) nim 1.000           
(2) PrivateTrans -0.289* 1.000          
(3) PublicTrans -0.135* 0.006 1.000         
(4) cost-Income 0.105* 0.064* 0.013 1.000        
(5) nonperform 0.200* -0.206* -0.076* 0.093* 1.000       
(6) infl 0.341* -0.190* -0.069* 0.063* 0.157* 1.000      
(7) gdpgrowth 0.090* -0.127* -0.062* -0.114* -0.111* -0.011 1.000     
(8) bankcon 0.030* -0.117* -0.134* -0.077* 0.020 0.027 -0.009 1.000    
(9) bankdiv -0.108* -0.024 -0.133* 0.155* 0.086* 0.110* 0.043* 0.099* 1.000   
(10) fincrises 0.016 -0.050* -0.080* -0.061* -0.152* 0.022 0.067* 0.000 0.014 1.000  
(11) rrate 0.281* -0.102* -0.002 0.139* 0.122* -0.335* 0.050* 0.028 0.011 -0.112* 1.000 
 
Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector 
transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; COST-INCOM-cost 
efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-bank 
concentration; BANKDIV-bank;diversification;FINCRISES-2007-2009;financialcrises;RRATE-real interest real 
In Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, the study reports the effect of private and public sector led financial sector 
transparency using eight-six economies across the globe between 2005 and 2016. Specifically, Table 5 
reports evidence on the effect of private and public sector led financial sector transparency on bank interest 
margins using fixed effects and two-step generalized method of moments in the full sample, while Table 6 
reports the threshold effect of private and public sector-led financial sector transparency at different levels 
(quantiles .25, .50, .75 and .95) of bank interest margins using bootstrap quantile regression models for the 
full sample. However, Table 7 reports the effect of both private and public sector led financial sector 
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transparency on bank interest margins across four (4) continents using fixed effects and two-step 
generalized method of moments, Tables 8 and 9 report the effect of both private and public sector led 
financial sector transparency on bank interest margins respectively across four (4) continents using fixed 
effects and two-step generalized method of moments. The discussions on the results and findings largely 
focus on the Two-Sep GMM while the bootstrap quantile regressions are discussed briefly to determine the 
threshold effect of financial sector transparency on bank interest margins. 
Table 5: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency on Net Interest margins – Full Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Fixed Effect Models  Wo-Step GMM Models 
VARIABLES Private-Trans Public-Trans Both  Private-Trans Public-Trans Both 
LNIM     0.386*** 0.401*** 0.411*** 
     (0.0774) (0.0809) (0.0747) 
Private-Trans -0.00680  -0.00658  -0.00767**  -0.00772** 
 (0.00426)  (0.00424)  (0.00335)  (0.00320) 
Public-Trans  -0.00890 -0.00834   -0.0100* -0.0115** 
  (0.00599) (0.00571)   (0.00530) (0.00544) 
Cost-Income -0.00381 -0.00603 -0.00450  0.0260** 0.0195* 0.0225* 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0102)  (0.0112) (0.00992) (0.0113) 
nonperform -0.0239 -0.0212 -0.0213  -0.0176 -0.00674 -0.0170 
 (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169)  (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0158) 
Infl 0.0977*** 0.104*** 0.0950***  0.127*** 0.144*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0300) (0.0311)  (0.0233) (0.0246) (0.0233) 
gdpgrowth 0.0235* 0.0258* 0.0218*  0.0304* 0.0396* 0.0264 
 (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0123)  (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0165) 
bankcon -0.00436 -0.00369 -0.00578  -0.000640 -0.00153 -0.00381 
 (0.00830) (0.00865) (0.00843)  (0.00435) (0.00430) (0.00461) 
bankdiv -0.0408*** -0.0402*** -0.0420***  -0.0278*** -0.0288*** -0.0284*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0107)  (0.00866) (0.00842) (0.00872) 
fincrises -0.0572 -0.0832 -0.0776  -0.0852 -0.132 -0.133 
 (0.0815) (0.0887) (0.0875)  (0.0963) (0.0952) (0.0928) 
rrate 0.0819*** 0.0870*** 0.0781**  0.0907*** 0.101*** 0.0838*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0297) (0.0306)  (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0250) 
Constant 6.154*** 5.961*** 6.423***  1.465** 1.419** 1.939*** 
 (0.793) (0.803) (0.800)  (0.566) (0.571) (0.626) 
F-Stats 5.59(0.000) 5.11(0.000) 4.87(0.000)  29.98(0.000) 23.02(0.000) 27.92(0.000) 
Observations 603 603 603  603 603 603 
R-squared 0.178 0.174 0.183     
Number of ccode 86 86 86  86 86 86 
Instruments     28 28 29 
AR (1)     -4.14(0.000) -4.01(0.000) -4.17(0.000) 
AR (2)     -0.71(0.487) -0.75(0.452) -0.65(0.517) 
Sargan     24.63(0.103) 23.33(0.139) 23.52(0.131) 
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Hansen     12.90(0.743) 12.47(0.771) 13.74(0.685) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses -*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1- Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-
financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; COST-
INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-
bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises, RRATE-real interest rate 
 
From the results in Table 5, there is evidence to suggest that financial sector transparency impedes wide 
bank interest margins. Specifically, the two-step GMM results in Table 5 suggest that financial sector 
transparency through credit information sharing coverage reduce bank interest margins in the full sample. 
Thus, private and public sector led financial sector transparency (see Models 4 and 5) reduces bank 
interest margins to the benefit of the society and participants of the banking market. This finding confirms 
that financial sector transparency whether through the private or public sector dampens bank interest 
margins. Observing from the results in Models 4, 5 and 6, the reducing effect of financial sector 
transparency on bank interest margin is larger when transparency in the financial sector is led by the public 
sector. However, the difference in the coefficients of private and public sector-led transparency is confirmed 
to be insignificant following the Z-statistics approach of Van Beers and Zand (2014) and Clogg, Petkova 
and Cheng (1995) (see Appendix 9). Hence, no statistical evidence is obtained to support the observed 
difference in the coefficients of public and private sector led transparency. Thus, insufficient statistical 
evidence to confirm the effectiveness of public sector-led transparency over private sector-led 
transparency. This finding contradicts the study of Asongu (2017) and Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and 
Pyke (2019) who report that transparency through public credit information sharing institutions are more 
effective. Similarly, further analyses in Table 6 using bootstrap quantile regressions show that both private 
and public sector led financial sector transparency reduce bank interest margins to the benefit of the 
society and participants of the banking market (see Models 7-18). However, the reducing effect of financial 
sector transparency is seen in the lower and mid-quantiles (25th, 50th and 75th quantiles). Interestingly, 
private sector-led transparency is reported to be more consistent in reducing bank interest margins across 
quantiles employed. This however implies that economies can rely on both public and private sector led 
transparencies to reduce bank interest margins. 
Further attempts in Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the continental level effect of financial sector transparency on 
bank interest margins. In Table 7 where the effect of both private and public sector led financial sector 
transparency is employed, it is interesting to observe that bank interest margins in Africa (see Model 24) is 
reduced when both private and public sector lead financial sector transparency are included in the model 
although the effect is higher for public sector led financial sector transparency. Similarly, it is evident that 
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bank interest margin in Europe (see Model 25) and North and South America (Model 23) is reduced by 
financial sector transparency led by the public sector. More so, in Tables 8 and 9 where private and public 
sector financial sector transparency are used respectively, it is observed that bank interest margins is 
reduced by financial sector transparency led by the private sector in Africa (Model 32) and Asia and 
Oceania (Model 34) while bank interest margins is reduced by financial sector transparency led by the 
public sector in North and South America (39), Africa (40) and Europe (Model 41).  
These show that financial sector transparency is crucial for lowering the bank interest margin which is cost 
to financial market participants but gains to banks. However, while both private and public sector led 
transparencies may reduce bank interest margins, public sector-led financial sector transparency is more 
consistent and significant in reducing bank interest margins. Thus, improved financial sector transparency, 
whether through private or public sector, translates into reduced bank interest margins. These findings 
confirm prior studies (Kusi and Mensah, 2018; Kusi et al., 2017; 2016; Asongu, 2017; Asongu, le Roux, 
Nwachukwu and Pyke, 2019) that show that financial sector transparency through credit information 
sharing improves banking sector activities. This study argues that financial sector transparency reduces 
bank interest margins because its ability to reduce information asymmetry, banking uncertainties and 
premium margin which have the potential to increase bank margins.  
On the control variables, cost-income ratio which indicates cost efficiency is positively and significantly 
related to bank interest margins in the full sample (Models 4, 5 and 6) and also in Africa (Models 24, 32 and 
40). Thus, banks pass on the inefficient cost to their client through the rates they charge. This finding is in 
line with the results of prior studies (Tarus et al., 2012; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Abreu 
and Mendes, 2003). Also, nonperforming loans although did not show any significant effect on bank interest 
margins in Table 5, it reported a significant negative effect on bank interest margins in Africa (Models 24 
and 32). This finding implies that in Africa nonperforming loans impede the wider bank interest margins. 
The significant negative effect of credit risk on bank interest margin confirms prior studies (Tarus et al., 
2012; Angbazo, 1997).  
From the macroeconomic perspective, inflation is positive and significantly related to bank interest margin 
in the full sample (see Models 4, 5, 6), Africa (Model 32 and 40), North and South America (Models 23, 31 
and 39), Europe (Models 25 and 41) and Asia and Oceania (Models 26, 34 and 42). Hence, following 
Rasiah (2010) the positive relation is explained as banks in an attempt to avoid the risk of inflation capture 
and transmit inflation risk to their client through their margins; hence the positive significant relationship. 
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Similarly, gross domestic product growth rate positively and significantly increased bank interest margin in 
the full sample (Models 4 and 5), Africa (Model 32) and Asia and Oceania (Models 26, 34 and 42). 
However, in Europe (Models 25 and 33), a negative relationship is reported between gross domestic 
product growth rate and bank interest margins. Thus, following Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2001) the study argues that improved gross domestic product growth (which indicates improved welfare) 
signals ability to pay and service credit obligations; hence resulting in increased bank interest margins 
because of increased ability to service loans during higher growth periods. On the other hand, the negative 
effect could be explained following prior studies (Islam and Nishiyama, 2016; Tarus et al., 2012; Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2004) that  argue that economic growth represents enhanced welfare and hence pressures 
banks to lower interest charges in order to attract clients during economic growth era. 
Interestingly, while the study finds no significant relation between bank concentration and bank interest 
margins in the full sample (Models 4, 5 and 6), a significant positive relationship is evident between bank 
concentration and bank interest margins in Asia and Oceania (Model 26 and 34) and Europe (Model 33). 
Hence, following Islam and Nishiyama (2016), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) and Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000) the positive relation between bank concentration and bank interest margin is 
argued as: concentration increases market power of the fewer banks in the industry; hence inducing the 
monopolistic power of banks to charge higher loan prices and earn higher interest margins or spread. More 
so bank diversification is reported to reduce bank interest margins in the full sample (Models 4, 5 and 6), 
Europe (Models 25, 33 and 41), North and South America (Model 23, 31 and 39) and Africa (Models 24, 32 
and 40). Likewise, the study shows that the 2007-2009 financial crises reduced bank interest margins in 
Asia and Oceania (Models 26 and 42) but increased bank interest margins in America (Model 31). This 
finding is not surprising given that prior studies (see Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2009) have found 
both positive and negative effect of financial crises on bank margins. Finally, real interest rate is found to be 
positively and significantly related to bank interest margins in North and South America (Models 23, 31 and 
39) and Asia and Oceania (Models 26, 34 and 42). This finding confirms the prior expectation of this study 
and also the findings of prior studies (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Wong, 1997). 
 
.
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Table 6: Threshold Effect of Financial Sector Transparency on Net Interest Margins – Full Sample 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Qunatiles 0.25 0.50 0.75 .95 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.95 
VARIABLES PrivateTrans PrivateTrans PrivateTrans PrivateTrans PublicTrans PublicTrans PublicTrans PublicTrans Both Both Both Both 
Private-Trans -0.00836*** -0.00891*** -0.00645** -0.00212     -0.00830*** -0.00898*** -0.00817** -0.00145 
 (0.00224) (0.00235) (0.00287) (0.00702)     (0.00222) (0.00254) (0.00358) (0.00638) 
Public-Trans     0.00368 -0.00527* -0.0145*** -0.0235 0.00187 -0.00718 -0.0155** -0.0228 
     (0.00448) (0.00309) (0.00531) (0.0148) (0.00481) (0.00498) (0.00626) (0.0150) 
Cost-Income 0.0328*** 0.0499*** 0.0486*** 0.0917*** 0.0312*** 0.0341*** 0.0443*** 0.0931*** 0.0341*** 0.0469*** 0.0499*** 0.0939*** 
 (0.00579) (0.00997) (0.00837) (0.0183) (0.00574) (0.00856) (0.00751) (0.0134) (0.00783) (0.00908) (0.00816) (0.0177) 
nonperform -0.0256 -0.0217 0.0264 0.0645 0.00413 -0.00923 0.0394** 0.0537* -0.0255 -0.0202 0.0213 0.0573 
 (0.0178) (0.0168) (0.0185) (0.0393) (0.0146) (0.0183) (0.0158) (0.0309) (0.0191) (0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0476) 
infl 0.233*** 0.302*** 0.374*** 0.359*** 0.231*** 0.345*** 0.370*** 0.377*** 0.231*** 0.306*** 0.352*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0434) (0.0248) (0.0195) (0.0213) (0.0473) (0.0202) (0.0173) (0.0256) (0.0514) 
gdpgrowth 0.0725*** 0.0674** 0.0652** 0.0741* 0.116*** 0.0873*** 0.0839*** 0.0725 0.0714** 0.0688** 0.0683*** 0.0717*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0264) (0.0301) (0.0436) (0.0252) (0.0277) (0.0298) (0.0456) (0.0311) (0.0331) (0.0197) (0.0268) 
bankcon -0.00796** -0.00146 0.00544 0.0168 -0.00928** -0.00658 -0.000217 0.0150 -0.00732* -0.00156 0.00215 0.0162* 
 (0.00405) (0.00412) (0.00441) (0.0127) (0.00456) (0.00416) (0.00592) (0.00983) (0.00400) (0.00538) (0.00493) (0.00918) 
bankdiv -0.0396*** -0.0360*** -0.0261*** -0.0552*** -0.0384*** -0.0344*** -0.0428*** -0.0544*** -0.0395*** -0.0352*** -0.0335*** -0.055*** 
 (0.00584) (0.00751) (0.00963) (0.0192) (0.00527) (0.00763) (0.00896) (0.0163) (0.00653) (0.00812) (0.0118) (0.011) 
fincrises -0.0720 -0.187 -0.501* -0.889* -0.220 -0.132 -0.463** -0.839 -0.0519 -0.210 -0.469* -0.864 
 (0.173) (0.230) (0.262) (0.501) (0.207) (0.195) (0.235) (0.697) (0.155) (0.156) (0.269) (0.620) 
rrate 0.203*** 0.254*** 0.303*** 0.311*** 0.195*** 0.279*** 0.304*** 0.327*** 0.201*** 0.254*** 0.291*** 0.319*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0173) (0.0235) (0.0525) (0.0177) (0.0250) (0.0282) (0.0455) (0.0293) (0.0240) (0.0312) (0.0432) 
Constant 1.509*** 0.315 -0.341 -0.575 0.970*** 0.679 0.656 -0.752 1.401** 0.464 0.463 -0.711 
 (0.481) (0.507) (0.576) (1.475) (0.373) (0.523) (0.628) (1.162) (0.561) (0.495) (0.634) (1.188) 
Pseudo R2 0.343 0.404 0.427 0.417 0.332 0.397 0.427 0.426 0.343 0.406 0.433 0.426 
Observations 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial 
sector transparency led by public sector; COST-INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-bank concentration; 
BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises; RRATE-real interest rate 
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Table 7: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency across Regional Continents – Both Private and 
Public Sector Led  
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22  Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
 Fixed Effect Models  Two-Step GMM Models 
VARIABLES North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
 North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
          
L.NIM      0.473*** 0.0512 0.777*** 0.567*** 
      (0.148) (0.141) (0.0601) (0.143) 
PrivateTrans 0.000145 -0.0153 -0.0112 0.00145  0.00503 -0.0385*** -0.00181 -0.00231 
 (0.00700) (0.00924) (0.00673) (0.0135)  (0.00533) (0.0118) (0.00184) (0.00226) 
Public-Trans -0.00618 -0.0843 -0.0125 -0.0249  -0.00647** -0.402** -0.00687* -0.000151 
 (0.00548) (0.121) (0.0128) (0.0206)  (0.00268) (0.185) (0.00363) (0.00607) 
Cost-Income 0.0117 0.0333 -0.0148 -0.00749  0.0158 0.129*** -0.00404 -0.000837 
 (0.0118) (0.0283) (0.0145) (0.0168)  (0.0165) (0.0347) (0.00532) (0.00655) 
Nonperform -0.0982*** 0.00959 -0.0133 0.00660  -0.0454 -0.0790* -0.00353 -0.0171 
 (0.0304) (0.0396) (0.0299) (0.0765)  (0.0438) (0.0384) (0.00888) (0.0339) 
Infl 0.0738* 0.000847 0.128* 0.119*  0.0726*** 0.0266 0.0704*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0587) (0.0680) (0.0653)  (0.0239) (0.0461) (0.0234) (0.0359) 
gdpgrowth -0.0685 -0.00928 0.0291 0.0412*  -0.0508 0.00242 -0.0385* 0.0339** 
 (0.0487) (0.0221) (0.0371) (0.0239)  (0.0513) (0.0451) (0.0222) (0.0160) 
Bankcon -0.0123 -0.0192 -0.00735 -0.00474  0.00271 0.00416 0.000396 0.00725* 
 (0.00822) (0.0469) (0.00860) (0.0153)  (0.00614) (0.0149) (0.00472) (0.00419) 
bankdiv -0.0297*** -0.100*** -0.0330* -0.0263  -0.0326*** -0.115*** -0.0108** 0.00156 
 (0.00711) (0.0258) (0.0174) (0.0241)  (0.00840) (0.0313) (0.00498) (0.0138) 
fincrises 0.307 0.143 -0.218 -0.134  0.188 0.0449 0.0264 -0.270* 
 (0.180) (0.251) (0.235) (0.172)  (0.148) (0.271) (0.130) (0.146) 
rrate 0.0592 0.0233 0.108 0.101  0.0524* 0.00917 0.0421 0.123*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0448) (0.0780) (0.0630)  (0.0265) (0.0373) (0.0273) (0.0377) 
Constant 6.728*** 10.10** 6.344*** 4.163***  2.440* 4.126 1.149** -0.0670 
 (1.151) (4.664) (1.039) (1.445)  (1.306) (2.418) (0.475) (0.751) 
F-Stats 25.98(0.00) 20.01(0.000) 6.66(0.000) 4.35(0.000)  11.98(0.000) 26.39(0.000) 383.13(0.000) 124.44(0.000) 
Observations 133 112 167 191  133 112 167 191 
R-squared 0.238 0.405 0.287 0.116      
Number of 
ccode 
17 18 22 29  17 18 22 29 
Instruments      15 17 14 21 
AR (1)      -2.26(0.024) -1.82(0.069) -1.92(0.055) -1.86(0.063) 
AR (2)      0.39(0.697) -0.56(0.575) -1.22(0.224) -1.42(0.154) 
Sargan      0.64(0.888) 20.80(0.001) 1.14(0.565) 19.71(0.020) 
Hansen      0.68(0.878) 6.09(0.298) 0.98(0.612) 9.65(0.379) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-
financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; COST-
INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-
bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises, RRATE-real interest rate 
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Table 8: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency across Regional Continents –Private Sector Led  
 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30  Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 
 Fixed Effect Models  Two-Step GMM Models 
VARIABLES North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia and 
Oceania 
 North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia and 
Oceania 
          
L.NIM      0.418** 0.629*** 0.934*** 0.500*** 
      (0.160) (0.165) (0.246) (0.0792) 
PrivateTrans -0.000631 -0.0182** -0.0101 -0.000329  0.00339 -0.0213** -0.00165 -0.00323* 
 (0.00719) (0.00766) (0.00653) (0.0150)  (0.00639) (0.00941) (0.00368) (0.00186) 
Cost-Income 0.00982 0.0352 -0.0129 -0.0101  0.0114 0.0412* -0.0202** -0.00182 
 (0.0132) (0.0290) (0.0148) (0.0165)  (0.0151) (0.0231) (0.00818) (0.00663) 
Nonperform -0.0881** 0.0136 -0.0218 0.0140  -0.0370 -0.0409** -0.00216 -0.0246 
 (0.0312) (0.0378) (0.0268) (0.0769)  (0.0438) (0.0176) (0.00978) (0.0304) 
Infl 0.0749* 0.000869 0.128** 0.130**  0.0680** 0.0696** 0.0668 0.132*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0570) (0.0591) (0.0626)  (0.0262) (0.0251) (0.0446) (0.0394) 
gdpgrowth -0.0631 -0.00740 0.0376 0.0423*  -0.0540 0.0282** -0.0531** 0.0283* 
 (0.0505) (0.0218) (0.0351) (0.0224)  (0.0367) (0.0129) (0.0216) (0.0144) 
Bankcon -0.0132 -0.0218 -0.00461 -0.00293  6.22e-05 0.00116 0.0206** 0.00784* 
 (0.00809) (0.0468) (0.00956) (0.0139)  (0.00534) (0.00591) (0.00837) (0.00442) 
bankdiv -0.0281*** -0.0978*** -0.0327* -0.0207  -0.0300*** -0.0526*** -0.0203* -0.00113 
 (0.00782) (0.0252) (0.0166) (0.0246)  (0.00704) (0.0177) (0.0115) (0.0130) 
fincrises 0.330* 0.153 -0.176 -0.114  0.228* 0.121 0.115 -0.238 
 (0.170) (0.244) (0.238) (0.162)  (0.130) (0.344) (0.155) (0.167) 
rrate 0.0601 0.0207 0.115 0.113*  0.0480* 0.0121 0.0472 0.138*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0435) (0.0700) (0.0601)  (0.0264) (0.0146) (0.0496) (0.0313) 
Constant 6.720*** 10.04** 5.907*** 3.698***  3.136** 1.886 0.511 0.209 
 (1.189) (4.691) (0.896) (1.184)  (1.472) (1.296) (1.497) (0.570) 
F-Stats 24.46(0.000) 16.66(0.000) 3.01(0.018) 5.71(0.000)  176.46(0.000) 69.24(0.000) 20.86(0.000) 91.80(0.000) 
Observations 133 112 167 191  133 112 167 191 
R-squared 0.232 0.402 0.273 0.100      
Number of 
ccode 
17 18 22 29  17 18 22 29 
Instruments      16 12 12 18 
AR (1)      -2.46(0.014) -2.24(0.025) -1.89(0.059) -2.40(0.016) 
AR (2)      0.54(0.588) -0.23(0.817) -1.13(0.260) -1.52(0.130) 
Sargan      1.89(0.865) 0.53(0.465) 0.41(0.520) 17.39(0.021) 
Hansen      1.83(0.872) 0.34(0.560) 0.10(0.757) 6.04(0.536) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Note: NIM-bank interest margin; PRIVATE-TRANS-
financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector transparency led by public sector; COST-
INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-
bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises, RRATE-real interest rate 
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Table 9: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency across Regional Continents – Public Sector Led  
 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38  Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
 Fixed Effect Models  Two-Step GMM Models 
VARIABLES North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia and 
Oceania 
 North & 
South 
American 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
          
L.NIM      0.769 0.356 0.618*** 0.565*** 
      (0.488) (0.211) (0.196) (0.148) 
Public-Trans -0.00614 -0.106 -0.00918 -0.0245  -0.00574* -0.288** -0.00810* 0.00197 
 (0.00564) (0.116) (0.0122) (0.0217)  (0.00304) (0.127) (0.00454) (0.00488) 
Cost-Income 0.0117 0.0344 -0.0186 -0.00711  0.0150 0.0787*** -0.00283 -0.00294 
 (0.0118) (0.0278) (0.0156) (0.0160)  (0.0168) (0.0268) (0.00726) (0.00648) 
Nonperform -0.0981*** 0.0155 -0.0220 0.00517  -0.00388 -0.00953 -0.00689 -0.00780 
 (0.0304) (0.0396) (0.0283) (0.0707)  (0.0779) (0.0221) (0.0139) (0.0357) 
Infl 0.0736* 0.00139 0.139* 0.119*  0.0611*** 0.0838** 0.114* 0.129*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0556) (0.0674) (0.0651)  (0.0155) (0.0372) (0.0571) (0.0369) 
gdpgrowth -0.0686 -0.00857 0.0473 0.0404  -0.0435 0.0243 -0.00876 0.0381** 
 (0.0485) (0.0222) (0.0314) (0.0270)  (0.0452) (0.0180) (0.0356) (0.0183) 
Bankcon -0.0123 -0.0215 -0.00915 -0.00588  0.00890 -0.00104 -0.00532 0.00693 
 (0.00823) (0.0460) (0.00970) (0.0171)  (0.0123) (0.00871) (0.00750) (0.00439) 
bankdiv -0.0298*** -0.100*** -0.0284 -0.0262  -0.0333*** -0.0970*** -0.0175* 0.00282 
 (0.00642) (0.0257) (0.0173) (0.0239)  (0.00690) (0.0256) (0.00913) (0.0143) 
fincrises 0.308 0.156 -0.275 -0.143  0.119 0.00295 -0.0102 -0.270* 
 (0.183) (0.249) (0.224) (0.167)  (0.129) (0.280) (0.166) (0.155) 
rrate 0.0589* 0.0233 0.121 0.101  0.0357* 0.0330 0.0882 0.127*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0412) (0.0777) (0.0632)  (0.0202) (0.0263) (0.0675) (0.0388) 
Constant 6.739*** 9.978** 5.951*** 4.278***  0.652 2.943* 1.845** -0.186 
 (0.898) (4.518) (1.070) (1.499)  (3.676) (1.509) (0.877) (0.726) 
F-Stats 24.84(0.000) 8.68(0.000) 10.75(0.000) 4.70(0.000)  8.62(0.000) 67.58(0.000) 135.93(0.000) 98.93(0.000) 
Observations 133 112 167 191  133 112 167 191 
R-squared 0.238 0.401 0.250 0.116      
Number of 
ccode 
17 18 22 29  17 18 22 29 
Instruments      13 13 12 20 
AR (1)      -1.74(0.08) -2.01(0.044) -1.75(0.081) -1.84(0.066) 
AR (2)      0.41(0.683) -1.13(0.258) -1.27(0.203) -1.38(0.169) 
Sargan      0.21(0.900) 0.33(0.846) 0.14(0.709) 20.17(0.017) 
Hansen      0.11(0.946) 0.15(0.929) 0.14(0.705) 9.64(0.380) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 - Note: NIM-bank interest margin; 
PRIVATE-TRANS-financial sector transparency led by private sector; PUBLIC-TRANS- financial sector 
transparency led by public sector; COST-INCOM-cost efficiency; NONPERFOM-credit risk; INFL-inflation; 
GDPGROWTH-gross domestic product growth; BANKCON-bank concentration; BANKDIV-bank 
diversification; FINCRISES-2007-2009 financial crises; RRATE-real interest rate 
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Robustness Checks and Diagnostics   
To ensure consistency, reliability and efficiency of the models, a number of tests and actions were 
undertaken. First, outlier effects were screened for and controlled by the use of quantile regression models 
which are more robust in dealing with outlier effects. As a result, all outliers are detected and deleted; 
hence no outliers. Second, Pearson’s Correlation (Table 4) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) (Table 3) 
were also employed to check for multicollinearity and acceptability of variables used in the models. 
Following Kennedy (2008) who set the threshold of multicollinearity to 0.7, there was no evidence of 
multicollinearity while the VIF confirm eligibility of all the variables employed. Third, we employ the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects to justify the use of either ordinary least squares 
(OLS) or random effect generalized least squares (see Appendix 1) models. Given that the null hypothesis 
of the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test indicates preference for OLS, the study rejects the null 
hypothesis concluding that the alternate hypothesis which indicates the GLS is preferred is true. Fourth, as 
a means of selecting the appropriate GLS models for our models, the Hausman test is used to make a 
choice between fixed and random effects models. The results from the Hausman test (see Appendix 2) 
indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis (Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic) implying that the 
fixed effects is preferred to the random effects. Fifth, we check for autocorrelation (Appendix 3) and 
heteroscedasticity (see Appendix 4) and found evidence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity; hence 
we employ robust standard random models to ensure consistent, efficient, reliable and unbiased results. 
Sixth, given the possibility on endogeneity and the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, the 
study employs the two-step system generalized method of moments to control for endogeneity, 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Seventh, the study employs least square dummy variable corrected 
bias models (see Appendix 10 and 11) to enable the study control for possible Nickell bias (see Dang, Kim 
and Shin, 2015; Flannery and Hankins, 2013) and bootstrap quantile regression models to ensure reliability 
and consistency in our sample.  However, while the fixed effect and LSDVC models do not report 
significant nexus between financial sector transparency and bank interest margins, the study relies on the 
two-step GMM which produces significant nexus between financial sector transparency and bank interest 
margins for interpretation of the results. Hence, to a very large extent, the signs of the variables in Tables 
are consistent across the models indicating the consistency and reliability of the results and findings. 
Hence, our models are good and fit for generalization. 
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Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
This study attempts to establish the effect of financial sector transparency on bank net interest margins 
across eighty-six economies between 2005 and 2016. The study is motivated by the lack of empirical 
evidence on how financial sector transparency affects bank net interest margins despite intuitive and 
theoretical suggestions of a nexus between the two. It is against this back ground that this study provides 
evidence on the link between financial sector transparency and interest margins using two-step system 
generalized method of moments and quantile regression models.  
Overall, it is evident that financial sector transparency dampens bank interest margins across economies. 
Thus, financial sector transparency whether led by the private or public sector reduces bank interest 
margins. Specifically, the study finds that financial sector transparency led by the public sector is more 
consistent and reliable in reducing bank interest margins in many more economies. Furthermore, both 
private and public sector led financial sector transparency are effective at reducing bank interest margins at 
lower and middle levels. Even at the continental level, results show that both private and public sector led 
financial sector transparency are effective at reducing bank interest margins in African economies while 
private led financial sector transparency is effective at reducing bank interest margins in Asian and 
Oceanian economies. However, in North and South America and Europe public sector-led financial sector 
transparency is effective at reducing bank interest margins. 
From the above findings, policymakers including parliaments, bank managements and bank regulators and 
their allied agencies must enact policies and laws that deepen and expand financial sector transparency 
through credit information sharing in order to reduce bank interest margins for the good of banking market 
participants. Also, economies must be selective in the establishment and expansion of financial sector 
transparency through credit information sharing since public sector-led financial sector transparency is 
more consistent and persistent in reducing bank interest margins in many more economies. Hence, the 
enactment of policies and laws must be strategically done to promote the consistency, reliability, 
effectiveness and efficiency of both private and public sector led financial sector transparency depending 
on the continent in which an economy finds itself. 
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Appendix 
Appendix1: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
nim[ccode,t] = Xb + u[ccode] + e[ccode,t] 
Test:   Var(u) = 0 
 chibar2(01) =   667.78 
Prob> chibar2 =   0.0000 
 
Appendix 2: Hausman (1978) specification test  
 Coef. 
 Chi-square test value 61.00 
 P-value 0.000 
 
 
Appendix 3: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
F(  1,     73) =     39.024 
Prob> F =      0.0000 
 
 
Appendix 4: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (121)  =   5.7e+36 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Appendix 5: List of Economies Included in the Study 
 
Northern and Southern 
American Economies (17) African Economies (18) European Economies (22) 
Asian and Oceania 
 Economies (29) 
Argentina Algeria 
 
Albania Ireland Afghanistan Saudi Arabia 
Brazil Botswana Austria Italy Australia Singapore 
Canada Cameroon 
 
Belgium Ukraine Azerbaijan Sri Lanka 
Chile Congo, Rep. 
 
Bulgaria United Kingdom Bahrain Thailand 
Colombia Egypt, Arab Rep.  Norway  Bangladesh United Arab Emirates 
Costa Rica Gabon  Poland  Bhutan Vietnam 
Dominican Republic Ghana  Portugal  Cambodia Yemen, Rep. 
Ecuador Guinea   Switzerland  China New Zealand 
 
Kenya   Czech Republic  Hong Kong  Oman 
Guatemala Morocco   Denmark  India Pakistan 
Honduras Namibia   Spain 
 
Indonesia Philippines 
Mexico Nigeria   Finland Israel Qatar 
Panama Rwanda   France  Japan  
Paraguay Senegal   Sweden  Jordan   
Peru South Africa   Germany 
 
Korea, Rep.   
United States Tunisia   Greece 
 
Kuwait   
Uruguay Uganda   Hungary 
 
Malaysia   
Venezuela, RB Zambia   Iceland 
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Appendix 6: Private Credit Bureaus versus Public Credit Registries 
 Public Credit Registries Private Credit Bureaus 
Purpose  Banking supervision  Sharing of credit information to help lenders take informed 
decisions  
Coverage  Mainly large corporate. Limited in terms of history and 
type of data provided.  
Large corporations, SMEs, individuals. Longer history and more 
rich data provided.  
Ownership  Government or central banks  Government/central banks, lenders, lenders’ associations, 
independent third parties  
Status  Not for profit  Mainly for profit  
Data sources used  Banks and non-banks financial institutions  Banks, non-banks financial institutions, PCRs, tax authorities, 
courts, utilities  
Access  Restricted to information providers  Open to all types of lenders  
Sources: Miller (2003) 
 
Appendix 7: Data Summary 
Symbols Variable Names Definition of Variables Sources of Variables 
NIM 
Net Interest 
Margins 
Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a 
share of its average interest-bearing (total earning) 
assets. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-
financial-development 
PRIVATE-
TRAN 
Private Sector 
Financial Sector 
Transparency 
Private credit bureau coverage reports the number 
of individuals or firms listed by a private credit 
bureau with current information on repayment 
history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding. The 
number is expressed as a percentage of the adult 
population. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators 
PUBLIC-TRAN 
Public Sector 
Financial Sector 
Transparency 
Public credit registry coverage reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry 
with current information on repayment history, 
unpaid debts, or credit outstanding. The number is 
expressed as a percentage of the adult population. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators 
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COST-INCOME Cost Efficiency 
Operating expenses of a bank as a share of sum of 
net-interest revenue and other operating income. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-
financial-development 
NONPERFORM Credit Risk 
Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and 
principal past due by 90 days or more) to total gross 
loans (total value of loan portfolio). The loan amount 
recorded as nonperforming includes the gross value 
of the loan as recorded on the balance sheet, not 
just the amount that is overdue. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-
financial-development 
INFL Inflation 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to 
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services that may be fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres 
formula is generally used. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators 
GDPGROWTH 
Gross Domestic 
Product Growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions 
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators 
BANKCON 
Bank 
Concentration 
Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share 
of total commercial banking assets. Total assets 
include total earning assets, cash and due from 
banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, 
other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax 
assets, discontinued operations and other assets. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-
financial-development 
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BANKDIV 
Bank 
Diversification 
Bank’s income that has been generated by 
noninterest related activities as a percentage of total 
income (net-interest income plus noninterest 
income). Noninterest related income includes net 
gains on trading and derivatives, net gains on other 
securities, net fees and commissions and other 
operating income. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=global-
financial-development 
RRATE 
Real Interest 
rate 
Lending rate less inflation (consumer price index) 
Computed by authors based on data from World 
development Indicators 
FINCRISES Financial Crises 
Dummy which assumes a value of 1 for years 2007, 
2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise 
Capture Author Following Dietrich and Wanzeried, 2011; 
Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson, 2009 
 
 
Appendix 8: Test of Significant Difference in Private and Public Transparency Coefficients (Model 4 and 5) 
 
Z= 
|𝑏1−𝑏2|√𝜎𝑏12 +𝜎𝑏22   =  |−0.0100 + 0.0077|√(0.0053)^2  +(0.0034)^2  = 0.3653 
Appendix 9: Test of Significant Difference in Private and Public Transparency Coefficients (Model 6) 
Z= 
|𝑏1−𝑏2|√𝜎𝑏12 +𝜎𝑏22   =  |−0.0115 + 0.0077|√(0.0054)^2  +(0.0032)^2  = 0.6054 
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Appendix 10: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency on Net Interest margins – Full and Continental Samples 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Private Public Both  North&South 
America 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
 Full Sample  Continental Sample 
         
L.NIM 0.34079 0.34077 0.34076  0.27368 0.17328 0.37940 0.50182 
 (0.03097)*** (0.03097)*** (0.0310)***  (0.07881)*** (0.08821)** (0.06099)*** (0.05527)*** 
PrivateTrans -0.00014  -0.00010  0.00398 -0.01118 -0.00060 0.00060 
 (0.00262)  (0.00264)  (0.00484) (0.02348) (0.00446) (0.00625) 
PublicTrans  -0.00059 0.00057  -0.00177 -0.06093 0.00070 0.00405 
  (0.00454) (0.00458)  (0.00803) (0.12994) (0.00786) (0.01253) 
bankeff -0.00947 -0.00945 -0.00942  0.00850 0.00595 -0.01662 -0.01369 
 (0.00586) (0.00584) (0.00588)  (0.01607) (0.02034) (0.00995)* (0.01083) 
bankcrisk -0.02024 -0.02040 -0.02039  -0.05905 0.04238 -0.00717 -0.01162 
 (0.00950)** (0.00958)** (0.00959)**  (0.04927) (0.03312) (0.01744) (0.03042) 
infl 0.0748 0.07478 0.07473  0.08411 -0.02912 0.07511 0.06115 
 (0.01593)*** (0.01590)*** (0.01596)***  (0.02699)*** (0.06229) (0.02886)*** (0.05125) 
gdpg 0.0146 0.01471 0.01469  -0.06076 -0.00701 -0.00189 0.02159 
 (0.00948) (0.00947) (0.0095)  (0.03933) (0.01935) (0.03057) (0.01858) 
bankcon -0.00328 -0.00324 -0.00325  -0.00903 -0.04460 -0.00418 0.00596 
 (0.00455) (0.00455) (0.00456)  (0.01073) (0.02387)* (00.0090) (0.00831) 
bankdiv -0.03373 -0.03366 -0.03368  -0.03527 -0.09965 -0.02799 -0.00155 
 (0.00524)*** (0.00524)*** (0.00526)***  (0.01072)*** (0.01609)*** (0.00971)*** (0.01107) 
fincrises -0.67605*** -0.26522 -0.67802  0.33980 0.09453 -0.09990 -0.67733 
 (0.17085) (0.16449) (0.17174)***  (0.35341) (0.51352) (0.30870) (0.32391)** 
rrate 0.05456 0.05460 0.05456  0.06350 -0.00419 0.05515 0.04176 
 (0.01598)*** (0.01594)*** (0.01599)***  (0.02817)** (0.05470) (0.02997)* (0.05200) 
         
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 603 603 603  133 112 167 191 
Number of 86 86 86  17 18 22 29 
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ccode 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 –  
Instrumented: LD.NIM 
Instruments:   D.PrivateTransD.bankeffD.bankcriskD.inflD.gdpgD.bankconD.bankdiv 
D.fincrisesD.rrate D.year2004 D.year2005 D.year2006 D.year2007 D.year2009 
D.year2011 D.year2012 D.year2013 D.year2014 L2.NIM 
 
Appendix 11: Effect of Financial Sector Transparency on Net Interest margins – Continental Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES North&South 
America 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
 North&South 
America 
Africa Europe Asia & 
Oceania 
 Private Transparency Sample  Public Transparency Sample 
          
L.NIM 0.27271 0.17051 0.37966 0.49767  0.26554 0.17640 0.3790 0.50236 
 (0.07831)*** (0.08756)* (0.06069)*** (0.05360)***  (0.07806)*** (0.08752)** (0.06069)*** (0.05481)*** 
PrivateTrans 0.00395 -0.01235 -0.00078 0.00089      
 (0.00482) (0.02322) (0.00401) (0.00617)      
PublicTrans      -0.00158 -0.06753 -0.00116 0.00422 
      (0.00801) (0.12854) (0.00707) (0.01236) 
bankeff 0.00789 0.00661 -0.01682 -0.01333  0.00986 0.00543 -0.01660 -0.01355 
 (0.01576) (0.02019) (0.00967)* (0.01074)  (0.01596) (0.02021) (0.00991)* (0.01069) 
bankcrisk -0.05728 0.04509 -0.00721 -0.01279  -0.05775 0.04643 -0.00691 -0.01212 
 (0.04838) (0.03244) (0.01737) (0.03010)  (0.04917) (0.03185) (0.01727) (0.02985) 
infl 0.08389 -0.03067 0.07571 0.05975  0.07803 -0.03151 0.07429 0.06185 
 (0.02684)*** (0.06188) (0.02793)*** (0.05091)  (0.02592)*** (0.06177) (0.02813)*** (0.05056) 
gdpg -0.05911 -0.00587 -0.00212 0.02118  -0.06269 -0.00633 -0.00187 0.02143 
 (0.03841) (0.01910) (0.03034) (0.01848)  (0.03919) (0.01920) (0.03045) (0.01845) 
bankcon -0.00973 -0.04699 -0.00418 0.00573  -0.00872 -0.04819 -0.00443 0.00554 
 (0.01020) (0.02320)** (0.00800) (0.00825)  (0.01071) (0.02253)** (0.00878) (0.00707) 
bankdiv -0.03502 -0.09786 -0.02786 -0.00266  -0.03552 -0.09894 -0.02805 0.00146 
 (0.01061)*** (0.01555)*** (0.00957)*** (0.01050)  (0.01070)*** (0.01594)*** (0.00967)*** (0.01100) 
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fincrises -0.11337 0.6893 -0.27981 -0.67064  0.42138 0.06296 -0.01562 -0.32101 
 (0.35414) (0.48551) (0.36492) (0.32224)**  (0.36932) (0.56117) (0.40203) (0.32762) 
rrate 0.06313 -0.00711 0.05553 0.04058  0.05733 -0.00696 0.05434 0.04225 
 (0.02798)** (0.05406) (0.02956)* (0.05171)  (0.02710)** (0.05411) (0.02926)* (0.05158) 
          
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 133 112 167 191  133 112 167 191 
Number of 
ccode 
17 18 22 29  17 18 22 29 
Standard errors in parentheses - *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 –  
Instrumented: LD.NIM 
Instruments:   D.PrivateTransD.bankeffD.bankcriskD.inflD.gdpgD.bankconD.bankdiv 
D.fincrisesD.rrate D.year2004 D.year2005 D.year2006 D.year2007 D.year2009 
D.year2011 D.year2012 D.year2013 D.year2014 L2.NIM 
 
